

cloud cover pictures of the whole earth daily, continuous observation of the earth and its atmosphere from synchronous orbit, and daily quantitative measurements, such as temperature and pressure, at various levels in the atmosphere. The most significant progress has been made in the first objective—global cloud coverage—with the operation of the Tiros Operational Satellite—TOS—system.

The success of this system can be measured by the fact that satellite data is a daily required tool in hundreds of weather offices. Many users now consider the satellite essential to their environmental service missions, particularly in the West coast region of the United States where satellite pictures frequently provide the first information on developing weather off the coast where surface and upper air observations are sparse.

Other benefits include: Reduced use of aircraft for tropical storm reconnaissance, reduction of the time and cost to accomplish photo mapping of remote areas, and elimination of a costly weather-observing ship between New Zealand and Antarctica. No tropical storm—hurricane or typhoon—has gone undetected, or reached populated areas without warning for several years, due in large part to the availability of satellite data.

It is possible that this weather information may even enable us to control, or at least divert, storms and thus minimize their destructiveness.

Through the medium of the Earth Resources Program Review Committee, established by NASA during 1968, various departments of the Government assisted NASA in determining program objectives and evaluating potential applications of an earth resources program utilizing satellites.

Areas of investigation include hydrology and oceanography.

In the field of hydrology, the availability of ERTS data would permit evaluation for snowline mapping in potential flood areas such as the Upper Mississippi Valley, the Sierra Nevada, and the Northeast; observation of the extent of flooded areas; observation of the extent of river and lake ice; estimation of surface soil moisture; and estimation of maximum probable precipitation from storms.

In the field of oceanography, ERTS data would facilitate planning for the hydrographic survey of coastal waters; the location and extent of ice in inland waters and at sea; the study of estuarine mechanics; and surveillance of major ocean currents, among others.

The Department of the Interior utilizes ERTS data for its earth resources observation satellite program—EROS. Administered by the U.S. Geological Survey, EROS applies remote sensor information acquired from aircraft and spacecraft to land use and resources investigations.

The Department of the Interior is the principal resources agency of our Government. For the effective utilization and the conservation of our Nation's lands and natural resources, the space program can provide data for basic inventories of

natural resources and planning for their management.

An example of the contribution of the spacecraft to the work of the Geological Survey is the small-scale photomap acquired through photographs from space. With the addition of interpreted data from the color photos taken in the Gemini and Apollo programs, the Survey can produce such items as a geologic terrain map, a map useful in minerals exploration, and a land-use planning map.

In like manner, space vehicles will aid the resource programs of the Department of Agriculture. Joint research between NASA and USDA is directed to space systems that will be of use in the field of agriculture, forestry, and range management.

Surveys would be aimed at—identifying and measuring land use; detecting calamitous events, such as disease, insect infestation, and drought; assessing crop and timber stand conditions; and determining surface soil characteristics.

One important capability resulting from the application of remote sensing to agriculture and forest lands would be mapping of surface water, including snowpack, and identifying and mapping silt production and other water pollution sources.

Mr. President, I have mentioned only a few of the current, or near at hand, benefits of the space program. Because of it we are incalculably wiser in many ways. Now and increasingly in the future these byproducts of the "man on the moon" program will immensely enrich our life here on earth.

I share with all America great pride in the achievements of our astronauts, and the vast legacy of those achievements—a legacy made possible only through the labor and devotion of the administrators of NASA, the leaders of the Space Council, and thousands of scientists, technicians, and skilled workers—those in the contracting firms as well as in Government.

But I feel that the time has come to redirect our space objectives. For the present we should set our space sights on building an orbiting space station, supplied and managed through the use of a space shuttle system in which craft would go back and forth from earth to the space station on regular schedules and on productive missions.

Concurrently we should give considerably more attention and a much larger share of space appropriations to research which will increase supplies of food and other necessities, to preserving our life-giving environment, to reducing disaster losses, and to other earthbound problems.

A decade ago, an heroic goal—such as the man on the moon—was needed to establish order and provide objectives for the development of the building blocks essential to space capability. We now have those building blocks—and we need to drain from them all the beneficial returns possible.

It is time to focus our energies on what someone has called "inner space." When we have more nearly solved the fearsome problems presented here, it will be time to move again toward distant horizons.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MATHIAS obtained the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield before he begins?

Mr. MATHIAS. I yield.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator.

ALLEGED OBSOLESCENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL WAR POWERS OF THE CONGRESS

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, there are two principal theories advanced to explain the alleged obsolescence of the constitutional war powers of the Congress.

One theory is that in the nuclear age wars may be too large and cataclysmic to be channeled through congressional processes. This may be true. But it is irrelevant to the constitutional question, since no one has challenged the Executive's authority to repel attack on the United States or to act in accordance with treaty provisions ratified by the Senate.

The other theory, beyond the belief that wars are now too big and sudden for congressional deliberation, is that in the nuclear age wars are also too small and intricate to allow a congressional role.

The big war theory has never been tested and we all passionately hope it never will be. In any case, if nuclear holocaust occurs, the survivors will not be much concerned with constitutional proprieties. The small war theory, however, has been repeatedly asserted as policy by the Executive in relation to Vietnam. And now it is being repeated in relation to the expanding conflict in Laos. Laos has become an arena for the repetition of the mistakes of our Vietnamese involvement.

The intervention in Laos has been prosecuted without congressional deliberation or authority beyond the Tonkin Gulf resolution of 1964. In fact, U.S. military activities in that country clearly violate the spirit of both the national commitments resolution—requiring specific congressional approval for every new engagement of American troops abroad—and the amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act prohibiting use of funds for American ground combat troops in Laos or Thailand. News reports from usually reliable publications indicate the presence of hundreds of ex-Green Berets, described as having joined

the CIA in Laos because "they were fed up with having their hands tied in Vietnam." And military advisers are reported to be swarming over the country in numbers proportionately larger than the Kennedy administration commitment of advisers to the Saigon regime. The bombing of North Vietnam, which exceeded in intensity the highest levels of World War II, has now evidently been shifted to Laos.

These developments raise important questions of constitutional law. Can the reservation of war powers to the Congress be circumvented by redesignating soldiers as agents of the Central Intelligence Agency or as military advisers? Can such military actions by the CIA be accorded the clandestine status of authentic intelligence operations? By concentrating so many thousands of American officials in a small, beleaguered country like Laos—and exposing them to military peril—can the Executive in effect create an American military commitment without congressional approval and without the explicit engagement of ground combat troops? All these dubious disguises for military engagement are reportedly being used in Laos. If this is the case, each one subverts the constitutional powers of the Congress.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may continue for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I would further contend that Communist recapture of the Plaine des Jarres suggests that the intervention in Laos will not work. Every American escalation has been met by a North Vietnamese escalation. There are now said to be 50,000 North Vietnamese troops in the country. In recent weeks they were reportedly armed with antiaircraft missiles. They are evidently determined to keep open the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to counteract any substantial American gains in South Vietnam with further Communist entrenchment in Laos.

It would be a cruel disappointment of President Nixon's hopes for peace if success of Vietnamization in South Vietnam depended on escalation of the U.S. engagement in Laos. If that has become a new element of the conflict in Southeast Asia, then the American policy should be fully reappraised. For I believe that the American people—and the Congress—will not ultimately accept a withdrawal policy that entails merely a changing of uniforms and titles and a reengagement in Laos. It may well be that the weaknesses of our approach to disengagement in South Vietnam can be measured in part by the massiveness of our simultaneous military engagement in neighboring lands.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MATHIAS. I am very happy to yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator may be allowed an additional 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, may I say that I had the opportunity to read the short, to-the-point speech just made by the distinguished Senator from Maryland. I believe he is performing a service in trying to pinpoint a situation in Laos which is becoming increasingly more dangerous. The possibility of our further involvement has increased and there has been brought about a decided enlargement of the number of sorties flown over Laos, either across the Ho Chi Minh Trail or on the Plaine des Jarres. In the latter area, I understand on the basis of news reports, B-52's have for the first time been used in the past week or so.

What the Senator is endeavoring to do is bring the Congress into any decision which may be made in Laos. That is in accord with the national commitments resolution passed by the Senate by a large vote last year, and with the Cooper-Church amendment to the Defense appropriation bill, which was passed overwhelmingly, and which, as I recall, had the approval of the administration as well.

The Senator notes in his speech that—Laos has become an arena for the repetition of the mistakes of our Vietnamese involvement.

I would only amend that to express a wish and a hope, by saying that this is a possibility and not a probability at the moment.

May I say that I was surprised at the Senator's statement that there are "hundreds of ex-Green Berets" who have joined the CIA in Laos, because, as the Senator points out, if that is the case, then it is a horse of a different color, but still a horse as far as combat units are concerned.

The Senator indicates also that the bombing of North Vietnam, which has considerably exceeded the bombing in World War II in both the Pacific and the European areas, has now evidently been shifted to Laos, along the trail, the Plaine des Jarres, and elsewhere, with the cessation of the bombing in North Vietnam itself.

The Senator also brings out the fact that the Communists, the North Vietnamese, have been reportedly armed with antiaircraft missiles—I do not think there is any doubt about that—and that "they are evidently determined to keep open the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to counteract any substantial American gains in South Vietnam with further Communist entrenchment in Laos."

I would add to that the Kingdom of Cambodia as well, because it has been estimated that while there are approximately 50,000 North Vietnamese in Laos, backing approximately 25,000 Pathet Lao. There may be something on the order of 45,000 to 50,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong in Cambodia, along the remote northern frontier extending from where the kingdom abuts on Vietnam over into the province of Battambang, which abuts on Thailand.

I have been extremely worried about the situation in Laos in recent weeks, or I should say recent months, because it is part and parcel of what developing in

Vietnam, and there has been a decided shift into Cambodia and Laos from Vietnam itself.

I was perturbed, for example, when Mr. Colby, who appeared before the Symington subcommittee last week, indicated that we would be in South Vietnam for a period of at least 5 years, and that we could possibly get out in 10 years, provided that certain circumstances occurred.

It would be my hope that a speedup in the withdrawal policy could be brought about, and that such a speedup would not be dependent upon Hanoi's stalling or Saigon's wishes, but on what would be in the best interests of this Nation.

What will happen in Laos is anybody's guess. We can either continue at our present extensive and expensive pace—I mentioned that the sorties into Laos from outside areas come in the hundreds—we can escalate, which would create a very dangerous situation; or we can withdraw, which would place the Kingdom of Laos at the mercy of other and outside forces.

I would suggest, hopefully—and I emphasize the word hopefully—that one way out of the dilemma in which we find ourselves in Laos would be, once again, to call upon the co-chairman of the Geneva accords, which in 1962 brought about the neutralization of the Kingdom of Laos by means of which the neutralists, the rightists, and the Pathet Lao would each be accorded one-third of the representation in the Laotian Parliament.

It is my understanding that the neutralists and the rightists have filled their seats and that, while the seats allotted to the Pathet Lao are vacant, the seats are still there for Souvanouvong and his followers to sit in, if they only will.

If the situation develops further as it is proceeding at the present time, it may well be that we are in for a more difficult period. If that is the case, then I think all the plans for Vietnamization and all else will go down the drain, and we will find ourselves in a most difficult and dangerous situation. I hope that will not be the case, because, as the Senator has indicated, Congress in no uncertain terms and on two occasions, has declared that it would not favor further interventions unless we were consulted—and that was one of the points which the distinguished Senator from Maryland has tried to bring out. We did so in the national commitments resolution, and under the Cooper-Church amendment, and furthermore, that we would not favor U.S. combat troops—in whatever guise—for use in Thailand and Laos.

My concern is not mitigated by the fact that casualties are accumulating week by week. I do not know how anyone can get any satisfaction out of the fact that the deaths are running under 100 a week, even though that is a reduction from what it was a year ago, when casualties were running in the hundreds a day.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 5 additional minutes.

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The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The latest figures I have—and I get the sheet every week; this one is dated February 19, 1970—indicate that the casualties in Southeast Asia—I do not believe this applies only to Vietnam alone, but let us say it does, and leave aside the casualties which have occurred from various causes in Laos and Thailand—the figures show that up to this date, in Vietnam, 267,174 Americans had been wounded, 40,562 Americans had been killed in combat, and 7,458 Americans had died from other causes in Vietnam.

If we add those figures, we get a total of 315,194 dead and wounded, in an area in which we have no business, in a war in which we should not have been engaged, and in a conflict which is a continuing tragedy for this country and for its people, and from which, as far as I can see, no gain can be achieved.

So I am delighted that the distinguished Senator has raised the flag of warning on the situation in Laos. I would hope it would be possible, as a result of what the distinguished Senator has said, that there would be forthcoming shortly a Laotian report, sanitized and laundered, which would include the results of the hearings conducted by the Symington committee. If that report is not released shortly, it can only raise additional questions as to what we are doing in Laos. The people, if they are not told, are going to say, "Where there is smoke there must be fire."

Therefore, I think it would be in the best interests of all concerned if the report of the Symington committee were agreed to by both the State Department and the committee, released, and made available to the American public as well as to the Members of the Senate as a whole. As one who sat in those hearings, it is my opinion that there is very little in the record of those hearings which involves the security of this country. Anyone who reads the press assiduously and follows the information available therein will have a pretty good idea of just what has been happening in Laos, and will realize that this so-called secret war really has not been so very secret.

I commend the distinguished Senator for raising the question. I hope it will have an effect downtown, and I hope it will also serve as a warning, so that those who are in charge in the executive branch will be very careful as to what they do, and will not get this country involved in another Vietnam.

Mr. MATHIAS. I thank the distinguished majority leader for his very valuable contribution to this colloquy. He has not only added to our knowledge of the facts but, as is his custom, he has also made some very valuable suggestions as to practical steps that can be taken to deal with the situation in Laos. I am very grateful to him.

I am also grateful for the fact that I think he has correctly discerned my purpose in raising the question of Laos today, which is to engage the attention and the action, if need be, of the Senate on this developing situation. As the majority leader has stated, the reports which are

appearing in the press, and which, when put together, cumulatively form quite a bit of information, should be brought to the attention of the Senate. If they are wrong, or if they are inaccurate, we should know that. If they are accurate, we need to weigh them with all the seriousness that they demand.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. MATHIAS. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Maryland is recognized for 3 additional minutes.

Mr. MATHIAS. I thought it was impossible not to bring these reports to the attention of the Senate, because I thought it would be worse for us to ignore such reports now, after we have agreed to the national commitments resolution and to the Cooper-Church amendment, than it would have been had we sat silent in the first place. It would be totally quixotic to have made those gestures, and then, having charged at the windmills, to retreat into some imaginary La-Mancha of our own creation. I think the Senate cannot ignore the storm signals flying this morning.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MATHIAS. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from Maryland for bringing up this question.

We can say that the country has applauded the very clear-cut decision by the Nixon administration to draw down our forces in Vietnam. Further, the country has supported, and both parties have supported, the statement of the Nixon Guam doctrine which says that we will help others, but we will not so deeply involve ourselves in the future as we have done in Vietnam. Still I think there is a grave concern in the country as to where we are going in Laos.

I think the experience I have had is the same as that of the distinguished majority leader. When I have gone to Illinois on my last three trips, the first question put to me by almost any group was, "What is going on in Laos? We like the idea that we are withdrawing our forces in Vietnam. We like the idea that the Guam doctrine says we are not going to become involved this way again. We will help, but not take over. But what is going on in Laos?"

I found myself in the painful position, having been briefed in Vientiane, in confidential briefings, and having participated in a secret session in this body, of not being able to be absolutely candid with these groups.

I would hope that we would have as much revelation as possible in the reports forthcoming from the Symington hearings and others, to see that we inform the American people to the greatest extent possible, so that we will not have a credibility gap once again. At a time when we are drawing down our involvement in Vietnam, the same kind of condition should not be allowed to develop in Laos. Before we get deeply involved, the American people and Congress have a right to speak their minds.

I commend the distinguished Senator from Maryland for raising his voice this morning.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have indicated my fears, my worries, my concern, and my uneasiness about the situation which is developing in Laos. I have made the suggestion, hopefully and wishfully, but the suggestion nevertheless, that the cochairmen of the Geneva accords of 1962, to which the United States was a signatory, call a meeting of the signatories for the purpose of seeing if some way could not be found to maintain the agreement reached in 1962 which guaranteed the control of Laos and which called for a tripartite government made up of rightists, neutralists, and the Pathet Lao.

As I indicated, the neutralists and the rightists, so called—the names really do not really mean much so far as they are concerned—now have their proper one-third each of the seats in the Laotian Parliament. I also indicated, I believe, that the other third is vacant but the seats are waiting for the Pathet Lao to fill them, if they only would.

Under Prince Souphanouvong, the half-brother of Souvanna Phouma, they have declined to do so, although they maintain a company of approximately 100 men, under a colonel, in Vientiane, all the time, there is no governmental participation.

It may be that the reason why there is no participation is that the Pathet Lao, which number 15,000 to 20,000, are under the thumb of the North Vietnamese, who number somewhere between 50,000 and 60,000 in Laos at the present time. Thus, it is a serious situation and cause for concern, something which should be publicized.

I repeat, the hearings held before the subcommittee should be released, after proper sanitization, because there really is not too much that is new, if one has followed the public prints.

Mr. President, yesterday I noted an item on the news ticker, referring to the arrest of three newsmen by Laotian army officers.

According to the report, those detained were John Saar of Life magazine and Timothy Allman, a part-time employee of the New York Times. The third was connected with a foreign news agency, I believe the Bangkok Times. The ticker report indicates that the men were trying to get to a scene of military action. I find this morning that before they tried they were being conducted on a guided tour by the U.S. Embassy in Laos.

This morning's press carries a story on where they were headed. They were going to Long Chang, an airbase which has become very much a part of the war in Laos. As newsmen have been doing for as long as there have been newsmen, they were taking their chances.

Without knowing the full circumstances, I am not going to jump to conclusions about whether or not these men should have been where they were when arrested. In any event, they have been released. Nevertheless, I am deeply disturbed by a statement which is contained in the news item and which is attributed to the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, G. Mc-

Murtrie Godley. The Ambassador is quoted as saying that "the American mission has lost any interest in helping out the press whatsoever because of what has happened this afternoon."

I would suggest most respectfully that regardless of what happened that afternoon, the American Embassy in Vientiane should regain its interest in the press without delay. The Embassy in Laos has a responsibility to go on helping U.S. newsmen. It has a responsibility to assist them whenever and wherever they are in difficulties, whether or not the Embassy is pleased or displeased with what they may be doing. The American Ambassador does not have a choice in this situation. I repeat, he has a responsibility. He has an obligation.

The Ambassador to Laos might well be called upon, without delay, to explain his apparent washing of his hands of this responsibility. He owes that explanation to the President who appointed him and to the Senate which confirmed him. I would hope, therefore, that unless there is some clarification of Ambassador Godley's statement, committee inquiry would be initiated to determine the circumstances of its issuance.

May I say that the U.S. press almost alone, for a long time, has provided the American public with some clear light on the bizarre situation in Laos—this nonwar which, nevertheless, goes on destroying lives and property with increasing ferocity, this nonwar which has already cost the Nation many American lives in combat and billions of dollars.

Laos is not yet a second Vietnam. That it is not, may well be due to the persistent effort of the American press. It has put the spotlight on this obscure and remote tragedy. It has penetrated the veil of vague policy in which this involvement has been wrapped for too many years. It has flagged the dangerous drift for the President's attention, for the attention of the Senate, and for the people of the Nation—one would hope in time to prevent it from going completely out of control.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. I am glad to have been in the Chamber and to have heard the comments of the distinguished majority leader on the situation in Laos.

This subject has been a matter of concern to me for many months.

Last August, when the defense authorization bill was before the Senate, I found in the bill a section which I believed could be used to finance our forces to be used in the civil war in Laos.

I introduced an amendment to deny funds for the use of our forces in Laos in support of the local war there. It aroused a storm on the floor that day, which indicated to me that some Members of the Senate—although I was not one—knew we were engaged in a local war in Laos. The matter then went over until after the recess.

I introduced a similar amendment later. The Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), the manager of the bill, and others said they understood and supported my objective—an objective which

was supported by the majority leader. However, Senator STENNIS and others argued the amendment would not meet the end which I sought—the prevention of U.S. combat involvement in local or civil wars in Laos and Thailand.

They agreed with my objective to keep our country out of war in Laos.

The amendment was passed by a unanimous vote. But it had no effect, and our involvement in Laos has increased. I did not know the extent of our involvement in Laos when I introduced the first amendment.

When the defense appropriation bill came before the Senate in December last year, I could not be present because of illness in my family. The majority leader very kindly introduced the amendment for me and joined as a cosponsor.

The Senate went into closed session to discuss the situation and my amendment was modified to say in effect that "no American ground troops, should be used in Laos." And, of course, that amendment of Senator CHURCH and others had some effect. However, I insist that its prohibitions on the use of ground troops did not have enough effect to keep the United States out of an increasing military involvement in Laos. The facts which have become public since that time prove that what I had to say was correct. We are engaged in a war in Laos which is an internal war.

The question arises, upon what authority? There has been no declaration by the Congress of the United States that we should become involved in a war in Laos. There has been no statement by any executive of this or past administrations that there is some necessity for us to be involved in the war in Laos. There has been a declaration by the Senate, expressing its sense, through a national commitments resolution, that we should not become involved in another war and send troops to another country, without the consent of Congress.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to continue for 2 additional minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Kentucky may have an additional 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I can only think of two sources of authority for our military involvement in Laos—and we are so involved in Laos.

One is the use of the Tonkin Gulf joint resolution. The Tonkin Gulf joint resolution provides authority to the President of the United States to take such steps as he might think necessary to protect the protocol states under the SEATO Treaty—one of the states being Laos. But surely with all of the trouble we have had with the Tonkin Gulf joint resolution and the opposition that has been expressed by so many, even though we voted for it, surely we would not use that resolution for a second military involvement—in Laos—without coming to the Congress.

The only constitutional grounds upon which I believe we might be involved is

under the doctrine of military necessity. And that means, of course, that when a country is involved in war, as we are in South Vietnam, and situations arise which require the Commander in Chief in his judgment to take action which he believes to be necessary for the prosecution of the war and the security of our force, the laws of war hold that is permissible.

In the introduction of my amendment last August, I did not intend that it should forbid bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail, which is a necessary element in the South Vietnamese war and so stated. But the amendment did not intend that we should be engaged in bombing in an internal war in Laos.

The only reason I can suggest for our involvement is that we are either acting under the Tonkin Gulf joint resolution or from military necessity. Whatever the reason may be, I think the issue must be answered by the administration. The American people and Congress should be given the facts.

I understand the very difficult situation we are in in South Vietnam. I know that the President is trying to find a means to get out of the situation, to end the war to achieve a true peace, and I support him. But I do not see how we can get out of that situation by becoming involved in another war in Laos and increasingly so.

I shall continue to insist by amendment as bills come before the Senate that we deny any funds for involvement in war in Laos—which is an internal war—not simply the use of ground troops, but also by the use of Air Force, naval, and civilian forces acting under authority of the United States. However, occasioned it is an involvement in war which has not been authorized by Congress. It is an involvement whose extent we do not know.

This is a question which we must discuss and we must know. If there are strong reasons for our being involved there, such as its effect upon the war in South Vietnam, I think it would be of value to the administration and the country for the reasons to be known.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I should like to evidence my great admiration and deep regard for the Senator from Kentucky who has done so much to bring this vitally important matter before the Senate.

This is a bipartisan approach to reassert the responsibilities of the U.S. Senate. I was very pleased indeed that the administration, following the overwhelming adoption of the distinguished Senator's amendment concerning our involvement in Laos and Cambodia, indicated that it supported and favored such an amendment. It was a clear indication to the American people of the intention of this administration not to become as deeply involved overseas.

I think the real importance of this matter is the question as to where the priorities of the United States should be. We know that we must remain militarily strong. We cannot tempt any outside power to attack us. That would endanger our own national interest and the inter-

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est of our allies. But we have to weigh that outside threat against internal threats.

I was very struck by the distinguished Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, headed by Milton Eisenhower, when it concluded that through the ages, civilization generally has faced a greater threat from internal decay than from external assault.

I spent yesterday afternoon in Washington with Mr. Andrew Heiskell, Chairman of the National Urban Coalition. And I have spent hours with him, as I have with John Gardner. We have talked about the great threat we face from inside urban America. I think it is a question of priorities. Where do we put our resources?

I say further that I was very pleased that the administration thought through this whole concept of whether we should have a capability to wage one minor and two major wars simultaneously. This had been through a directive of the National Security Council.

In thinking through this particular premise, the administration concluded that we do not need such a capability to maintain the defense of this country. It was a wise decision.

I hope it will enable us to draw down our military expenditures so that we can alleviate the bitterness and despair that have caused riots in the streets once before and can again, if we do not measure up to our responsibility. The only way we can do it is to look carefully at our continued involvement in foreign situations which once again, like quicksand, could draw us in before we know what we are doing as a people and as a Congress.

Mr. President, I think the distinguished Senator from Kentucky has rendered a great service to Congress and to the people of this country in bringing this matter to our attention and urging full disclosure of what is being done in this area.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at the conclusion of my remarks what the Eisenhower Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence had to say about nation building at home.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

When in man's long history other great civilizations fell, it was less often from external assault than from internal decay. Our own civilization has shown a remarkable capacity for responding to crises and for emerging to higher pinnacles of power and achievement. But our most serious challenges to date have been external—the kind this strong and resourceful country could unite against. While serious external dangers remain, the graver threats today are internal: haphazard urbanization, racial discrimination, disfiguring of the environment, unprecedented interdependence, the dislocation of human identity and motivation created by an affluent society—all resulting in a rising tide of individual and group violence.

The greatness and durability of most civilizations has been finally determined by how they have responded to these challenges from within. Ours will be no exception.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, any student of Southeast Asia knows that for not only

generations, but for decades and perhaps centuries, there have been rivalries, animosities, and tribal divisions frequently resulting in local hostilities. The intervention of the great powers into such a volatile and explosive situation, with the ideological contest making the primitive people of this area the pitiless victims, and the furnishing of arms to both sides resulting in the slaughter of untold millions of natives, is not a pretty chapter in the history of the great powers.

What is happening in Laos now is tragic; another country being split in two. Will it be another Korea? Will it be another Vietnam?

Mr. President, last evening I reread President Johnson's Johns Hopkins speech. I reread it in light of his recent television appearance in which he said he never sought victory in the normal sense. I am not sure I am using his exact words. So I looked back at the objective when he first offered negotiations. His objective was an independent South Vietnam. There never had been such a national identity before.

Shall we now seek an independent South Laos, a dependency?

Recently President Nixon made some cogent remarks about the divisiveness of the Vietnam war and he indicated the people could not be expected to support a war they did not understand. What understanding is there about the Laotian war in which the distinguished Senator from Kentucky says we are engaged? Not only is there official silence, but there is the use of terms to mislead the public to divert its attention from the real facts. Moreover, the record of the committee hearings are withheld from the public. Why? There may be several reasons but one of them may be that our activity in Laos is in violation of the Geneva agreement, to which we were a party.

Indeed, the fact of our involvement has been concealed from the people by the use of terms, words of military art, and phraseology designed to conceal instead of to reveal.

There should be greater caution exercised, Mr. President, before the involvement of this great Nation into a conflict; and particularly is there a moral issue involved when the pitiless victims are made such pawns of the ideological rivalry of the major powers.

THE POLITICS OF THE EPITHET

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, 3 years ago, and also in 1968, this Nation was wracked by racial strife. It became known as an era of the politics of confrontation.

But, Mr. President, this politics of confrontation was preceded by what can best be described as the politics of the epithet. Too many people substituted name calling for rationality. The dialog between committed people of all races and faiths was drowned out by the clamor that well up in this country.

Many black Americans were frustrated by what they felt was inaction in meeting their very real and very pressing problems. The politics of the epithet fanned this frustration into ferment.

Many black Americans were bitter because of what they deemed a lack of

concern for their problems. The politics of the epithet fanned this bitterness into rage.

Ferment and rage were fanned even hotter by the continued politics of the epithet. And parts of many of our cities burned. Some of our people died. Many more were ruined.

Then, a little over a year ago, the President of the United States, standing on the steps of this Capitol, called on Americans to lower their voices so they could hear each other speak. And the vast majority of Americans responded. It was our hope—and the hope, I am sure of responsible men in both major political parties—that we had seen the last of politics of the epithet. We began to get about the business of solving the problems that had become obscured by the noise and the rancor of name calling.

Now, however, I am shocked by the return to this politics of the epithet which was demonstrated yesterday by a few who appeared before the Democratic policy council to raise their voices to a high pitch.

I do not feel it serves any good or useful purpose for a man who once held a responsible post with the Government to call a high-ranking elected official of this administration, the Vice President of the United States, a racist. It serves no useful purpose to use a distinguished council of this type and a distinguished platform for this purpose. It serves instead to refuel the fires of hatred.

A racist is termed to be a man who believes that race is the primary determinant of human traits and capabilities and that racial differences produce an inherent superiority of a particular race.

There is not one iota of evidence that can be produced that the Vice President, who has spent a lifetime in public service, has ever held this belief.

Let it be noted here and now that all Americans—almost all Americans—are weary of raised and raucous voices and of irresponsible and ill-founded charges. We know that we cannot reweave the fabric of our society if there are those standing by who would do nothing but unravel it.

I am sure that the responsible men and women of the Democratic Party are as distressed as I am by this isolated incident of character assassination. It is my sincere hope that men of good will of all political colorations and all faiths will eschew the course suggested by yesterday's event and rather will bind themselves together in a rededicated effort to go about our important affairs of state, face up to our problems, and go about solving them.

In the dialog that should be carried on there is nothing wrong with expressing discontent about our institutions and pointing out ways in which they can be strengthened and made more responsible and responsive. There is nothing wrong with a person being criticized for his judgment or for the way in which he might solve a problem, or what he might say on a particular occasion. But it is irresponsible to brand as a racist a person holding high office who is devoting himself to the welfare of his Nation in the best way he knows how.

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MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States was communicated to the Senate by Mr. Jones, one of his secretaries.

PROPOSED U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO THE SPECIAL FUNDS OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK—
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
(H. DOC. NO. 91-260)

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, which, with the accompanying paper, was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

To the Congress of the United States:

In 1966, the United States—with strong bipartisan approval of the Congress—joined with other nations in the establishment of the Asian Development Bank. Since then this Bank has shown its ability to marshal funds from Asia, Europe and this continent for the purpose of economic development. In the short span of three years, it has effectively put these resources to work. It has demonstrated an ability to make a major contribution to Asian economic development. It gives evidence of a unique capability for acting as a catalyst for regional cooperation. And it can assist individual Asian countries find solutions to their problems on a multilateral basis.

Now it is time for the United States to reaffirm its support of the Asian Development Bank.

Experience has shown that effective Bank support of certain projects and programs essential to economic growth and development in Asia must involve some financing on easier repayment terms. The economic capabilities of some of the countries of Asia have not yet reached a level of development adequate to service needed loans on conventional terms. The Bank cannot furnish this needed financing out of its ordinary resources and the limited amount of special funds now available to it.

To measure up to its potential for assisting in the economic growth of Asia, the Bank must have adequate facilities and resources to provide concessional as well as conventional financing. I believe that the United States should now join with other donors in providing the Special Funds that will enable the Bank to meet a wider range of Asia's development needs.

The proposal I am submitting to the Congress would authorize the United States to pledge a contribution of \$100 million to the Bank's Special Funds over a three-year period. It would authorize the appropriation of \$25 million in the present fiscal year, and \$35 million and \$40 million, respectively, in the next two fiscal years.

This proposal is designed to assure that the United States contribution will have maximum impact on Asian development problems, that the Bank's Special Funds will constitute a truly multilateral financing facility, and that the United States contribution will take account of our own balance of payments position. To assure that other advanced countries

provide their fair share of these funds, the United States contribution would not exceed that contributed by other donors as a group, nor would it constitute the largest single contribution to the Bank's Special Funds. The terms governing the use of the United States contribution are clearly set forth in the bill I am transmitting to the Congress.

This support by our country will enable the Asian Development Bank to more effectively perform its critical role in promoting Asian economic progress. The Bank is in a unique position to do this because:

- It is first and foremost a bank, applying sound economic and financial principles to the job of development.
- It is Asia's own creation, largely conceived, established, financed and operated by Asians to meet Asian problems.
- It embodies equitable arrangements for sharing the burden of providing development finance.
- It brings to bear on Asia's challenging development problems the cooperative efforts of 33 nations, with balanced representation among Asian and non-Asian members, and among developed and developing countries.
- Its progress to date gives promise that it will become the important focal point for Asian development efforts envisaged by its founders.

Other developed country members already have responded to the Bank's need for Special Funds resources.

Japan has earmarked \$100 million of which \$40 million has already been paid. Canada is contributing \$25 million in five equal annual installments, while Denmark and The Netherlands have also contributed a total of \$3.1 million.

The Governors of the Bank have supplemented these contributions by setting aside for Special Funds purposes \$14.5 million of the Bank's own paid-in convertible currency capital resources, as permitted by the Bank's charter.

A United States contribution at this time will give additional needed strength to this essential supplement to the Bank's Ordinary Capital resources, and will encourage other developed countries to contribute to the Special Funds facility.

This proposal has been developed after careful study of the pressing development needs of Asia, of the ability of the Asian Development Bank to use Special Funds resources to help meet those needs, and of our own fiscal and balance of payments problems. I believe that it represents a sound and realistic balancing of those factors, and that it will serve the national interests of the United States in a number of ways.

- It will further demonstrate the strong United States interest in the economic development of Asia.
- It is responsive to the developmental needs of Asia and to Asian initiatives already taken to meet them.
- It will strengthen the Bank as a multilateral regional institution capable of dealing with current and future development problems in Asia.
- It will encourage other advanced na-

tions to provide their fair share of concessional aid to Asia—a region heretofore predominantly dependent on United States aid.

—It takes account of our fiscal and financial problems and contains the necessary balance of payments safeguards.

—It constitutes another example of effective utilization of the multilateral approach to economic development.

I urge the Congress to give this proposal its wholehearted and prompt approval.

RICHARD NIXON.
THE WHITE HOUSE, February 25, 1970.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

PROPOSED APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to authorize appropriations for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO GRANT A SPECIAL 30-DAY LEAVE FOR MEMBERS OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES WHO VOLUNTARILY EXTEND THEIR TOURS OF DUTY IN HOSTILE FIRE AREAS

A letter from the Acting General Counsel, Department of Defense, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend section 703(b) of title 10, United States Code, to extend the authority to grant a special 30-day leave for members of the uniformed services who voluntarily extend their tours of duty in hostile fire areas (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Armed Services.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE

A letter from the Secretary of the Senate, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report of the receipts and expenditures of the Senate for the period July 1, 1969, through December 31, 1969 (with an accompanying report); which was ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.

REPORT OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES

A letter from the Secretary, Export-Import Bank of the United States, reporting, pursuant to law, the amount of Export-Import Bank loans, insurance, and guarantees, issued in connection with United States exports to Yugoslavia; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

REPORT ON PROPOSED HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

A letter from the Secretary of Transportation, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on proposed freeway systems in the District of Columbia, dated January 1970 (with accompanying papers and report); to the Committee on Public Works.

REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

The following report of a committee was submitted:

By Mr. JACKSON, from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, without amendment:

S. 3427. A bill to increase the authorization for appropriation for continuing work in the Missouri River Basin by the Secretary of the Interior (Rept. No. 91-709).

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Mr. CASE. I am happy to yield to the Senator from West Virginia. As a matter of fact, if I may, I would like, on his behalf, to add his name to this declaration, making it 65 Senators in addition to the Senator from Maryland and myself.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank the Senator. That was the purpose of my request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CASE. I join with Senator TYDINGS in asking unanimous consent that the Declaration in Support of Peace in the Middle East be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the declaration was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

We, the undersigned Members of the United States Congress, declare:

A just and lasting peace in the Middle East is essential to world peace.

The parties to the conflict must be parties to the peace achieved by means of direct, unhampered negotiations. We emphasize these significant points of policy to reaffirm our support for the democratic State of Israel which has unremittably appealed for peace for the past 21 years. Our declaration of friendship for the State of Israel is consistent with the uninterrupted support given by every American President and the Congress of the United States since the establishment of the State of Israel.

It would not be in the interest of the United States or in the service of world peace if Israel were left defenseless in face of the continuing flow of sophisticated offensive armaments to the Arab nations. We adhere to the principle that the deterrent strength of Israel must not be impaired. This is essential to prevent full-scale war in the Middle East.

All the people of the Middle East should have a common goal in striving to wipe out the scourge of disease, poverty and illiteracy, to meet together in good faith to achieve peace and turn their swords into plowshares.

James B. Allen.
Birch Bayh.
Alan Bible.
Edward W. Brooke.
Quentin N. Burdick.
Robert C. Byrd.
Harry F. Byrd, Jr.
Howard W. Cannon.
Clifford P. Case.
Frank Church.
Marlow W. Cook.
Norris Cotton.
Alan Cranston.
Carl T. Curtis.
Thomas J. Dodd.
Bob Dole.
Thomas F. Eagleton.
Sam J. Ervin, Jr.
Hiram L. Fong.
Barry M. Goldwater.
Charles E. Goodell.
Robert P. Griffin.
Edward J. Gurney.
Fred R. Harris.
Philip A. Hart.
Vance Hartke.
Ernest S. Hollings.
Roman L. Hruska.
Harold E. Hughes.
Henry M. Jackson.
Jacob K. Javits.
Everett B. Jordan.
Edward M. Kennedy.
Russell B. Long.
Eugene J. McCarthy.
Gale W. McGee.
George McGovern.
Thomas J. McIntyre.
Warren G. Magnuson.

Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
Jack Miller.
Walter F. Mondale.
Joseph M. Montoya.
Frank E. Moss.
George Murphy.
Edmund S. Muskie.
Gaylord Nelson.
John O. Pastore.
Claiborne Pell.
Charles H. Percy.
Winston L. Prouty.
William Proxmire.
Abraham A. Ribicoff.
William B. Saxbe.
Richard S. Schweiker.
Hugh Scott.
Margaret Chase Smith.
Ralph Smith.
John J. Sparkman.
William B. Spong, Jr.
Ted Stevens.
Stuart Symington.
Joseph D. Tydings.
Harrison A. Williams, Jr.
Ralph W. Yarborough.
Stephen M. Young.

Mr. CASE. I thank the Senator from Florida for his generosity.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, reserving my right to the floor, I yield briefly to the Senator from Missouri.

SITUATION IN LAOS

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the American public has watched for the past several weeks as, by bits and pieces, the stories on the secret war in Laos have been disclosed. That there is an American involvement there is no doubt. But what it is in terms of the extent of U.S. activities and expenditures has never been disclosed to the American people.

As Senator MANSFIELD today has already pointed out, events of the past 24 hours, including a public statement attributed to the American Ambassador in Vientiane that "the American mission has lost any interest in helping out the press whatsoever because of what happened this afternoon," indicates that even the trickle of information from Laos by American newsmen is now to be impeded by the U.S. Government.

The Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad has for 4 months tried to get release of its transcripts on Laos so that the American public could know about this activity.

We believe it now more urgent than ever that this transcript be released; and in order to complete this record on U.S. activities since October, we have today asked Secretary Rogers to direct Ambassador Godley to return to Washington as soon as possible to appear before the subcommittee.

I ask unanimous consent that an article published in the New York Times of February 25, 1969, labeled "3 Newsmen arrested," be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Feb. 25, 1970]

THREE NEWSMEN ARRESTED

VIENTIANE, February 24.—Laotian Army troops today arrested three Western news-

men who had made their way unannounced to the Government base at Long Cheng. They were later released to a United States Embassy official.

G. McMurtrie Godley, the United States Ambassador to Vientiane, said in a statement that "the American mission has lost any interest in helping out the press whatsoever because of what happened this afternoon." He did not elaborate.

The newsmen arrested were John Saar of Life magazine, Max Colfalt, of Agence France-Press, and T. D. Allman, a part-time employee of The New York Times and The Bangkok Post.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I also ask unanimous consent that an article by one of these three newsmen in the London Times of February 23, "What Really Happened in the Plain of Jars?" be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the London Times, Feb. 23, 1970]

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN THE PLAIN OF JARS?

VIENTIANE, February 22.—It is a hard life for the 30 correspondents in Vientiane. Yesterday we were told that the Plain of Jars had been "swamped" by the communists. Today we were told that the attackers numbered no more than 400 and that the losses of the 1,500 defenders had been "extremely light" for the excellent reason that the positions had almost all been abandoned before the offensive.

The most embarrassing part is that the source of information was identical in both cases. The source is not Laotian but is certainly better placed than anyone else here to know what is happening, and it only supplies "news" on a "don't quite me" basis.

The sole fount of knowledge about the battlefield is the United States Embassy in Laos, thanks to its military attachés, who work out the tactics applied by government forces and supervise their application. Journalists and most Government leaders know from one day to the next only what the Embassy lets them know.

Knowledge after the event and the development of the unofficial statements coming directly or not from the Embassy confirmed today that the North Vietnamese offensive against the Plain of Jars was only a middling one, certainly less powerful than the offensives launched by the North Vietnamese this time last year against other objectives.

It was, however, preceded and accompanied by an American propaganda barrage on all levels which seemed to have been aimed in particular at getting public opinion to accept B52 bombing of the communications routes linking the North Vietnamese frontier with the Plain of Jars.

It seems that the North Vietnamese troops deployed in this sector never exceeded 3,000 or 4,000 men; that no attack involved more than 400 North Vietnamese at a time; and that the Government positions east of the plain and in the plain itself were deliberately evacuated, like the civilian population, with a minimum of losses for the Government side.

Tactics of this kind, accompanied by a propaganda campaign inflating the importance of the present North Vietnamese offensive, have many advantages and some inconveniences for the Americans and their allies.

The evacuation of civilians deprived the North Vietnamese of logistic support, food and labour that they would have received from that population after the withdrawal of Government troops.

The troop withdrawal to mountain positions west of the plain, which will be defended, eliminated the danger of posts relatively close to the North Vietnamese frontier being captured by surprise attack.

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The withdrawal, presented as a series of defeats resulting from a powerful North Vietnamese offensive, rendered "acceptable" to public opinion the use of B52s, which would have been hard to use against a zone where the positions were extremely interlocked.

The American strategists were apparently banking on the proverbial headstrong nature of the North Vietnamese, reasoning that they would not fail to thrust forward on progressively surrendered terrain even if it meant undergoing non-stop bombing. This result was partially achieved and one may expect "blanket bombing" of the North Vietnamese to continue.

Communist propaganda will not fail to exploit the withdrawal of the royal forces as a victory for the Pathet Lao. In the Government camp itself, the inflation of the North Vietnamese offensive by the only available information sources caused a ripple of anxiety that today's announcement of the small number of North Vietnamese troops in the offensive was perhaps intended to quell.

It looks in any case as if the United States does not intend to let up in Laos. This time last year the Plain of Jars and bordering areas are still forbidden territory for United States aircraft. Now B52s are being used against them.—Agence France Presse.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator from Florida for his courtesy in yielding to me.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield, so that I may ask the Senator from Missouri a question?

Mr. GURNEY. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Does the Senator mean by his statement that the United States has troops in combat in Laos?

Mr. SYMINGTON. It depends on a definition.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I mean Americans engaged in fighting on the ground.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am not in a position to answer any questions on the floor of the Senate in open session at this time asked by the able Senator from Arizona, because the transcript has not been released as yet on any meaningful basis, and we are not going to release said transcript unless it is meaningful.

Mr. GOLDWATER. The reason I ask is that it has not been any secret that we have been flying fighter support missions in support of the Laotian Army up on the Plain of Jars. The Senator, I know, has known about that for a long time. If the information is classified, I shall not press the point, but I wonder if there is information that there are actually ground troops engaged.

Mr. SYMINGTON. There are a lot of other ways of fighting besides the use of acknowledged and obvious ground troops.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I am sure the Senator knows what he is talking about. He just got back from over there. I was interested to hear whether there had been additional developments during the last month.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Especially because of my respect for the Senator from Arizona, I want to be as free as possible under the normal restrictions of disclosing classified information. But there has been a heavy escalation in the air war.

Mr. GOLDWATER. That is correct.

Mr. SYMINGTON. And it has not been only with respect to operations incident to the Ho Chi Minh trails.

Mr. GOLDWATER. That is true, to some extent.

Mr. SYMINGTON. It is not true just to some extent. It is true, period.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I look forward with a great deal of interest to what the Senator can develop on that.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I too, look forward to getting this transcript released on some meaningful basis. When the American people go to war, whether by land, or sea, or air, they should know something about it. The President of the United States, in his talk on the third of November, stated the American people would not support a war unless they did know something about it. We have had in the press reiterating what is still classified in our hearings.

Today the majority leader and, I believe also the distinguished junior Senator from Maryland had a colloquy. I did not hear it, but understand they thought that, inasmuch as the American Ambassador in Laos said from here on in, he would have no interest in helping the newsmen do their job, we had better find out what is going on.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I agree with the Senator, but I reiterate that the air support of the Laotian army certainly has not been a secret nor has the expansion of it been any secret. It has been reported rather accurately in print.

Mr. SYMINGTON. What has not been officially acknowledged is the nature and degree of our military operations in Laos. We had witnesses day after day last October. For 4 months now we have been trying to get declassified what the State Department still says should be classified. I disagree, especially as it has nothing whatever to do with security. If we agreed with State as to what should be released, the record would be meaningless and misleading.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I will look forward to seeing it.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator.

AIRPORT AND AIRWAYS DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1969

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 14465) to provide for the expansion and improvement of the Nation's airport and airway system, for the imposition of airport and airway user charges, and for other purposes.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, if we can get out of Southeast Asia and back to this airport bill, perhaps we had better do that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida has the floor.

Mr. GURNEY. As I was stating, my amendment seeks to encourage State initiative in airport planning.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. GURNEY. It has been suggested by its opponents that this amendment would make State channeling agencies mandatory. That was not my intention in drafting it or even offering it. To my knowledge at least 33 States have adopted legislation which requires some degree of State responsibility in airport planning and in the administration of funds coming to them under the Federal airport aid programs. My amendment, as far as I can see, would in no way interfere with the freedom of choice

of the remaining 17 States. I think that there would be created an incentive—a very modest incentive considering the total dollars here involved—but an incentive none the less for the 17 States currently without such State coordinating agencies or instrumentalities to bring such agencies into existence. The funds under my amendment would be available to those States which have channeling agencies in existence and which have accepted responsibility in connection with the Federal airport program. I stress that the amendment is in no way coercive: funds are available elsewhere for individual airport assistance. Candidly, I must say that I think it would be very salutary if all States were to have State agencies through which the Federal Government could channel funds. Uniformity of this sort would ease administrative problems, probably make the program run more efficiently, and perhaps save some money. But I recognize that the choice to act or refrain properly resides with the individual States. I would point out that our experience under the Federal Highway Act shows the utility of a single State agency coordinating the entire program. As it stands now, the Department of Transportation is very frequently forced to deal with a multiplicity of applicants: individual cities, counties, towns, airport authorities, and the like. I am not by disposition or philosophy an advocate of rigidly structured Federal programs. But I do have a great deal of respect for the States as States and as members of the Federal union. I think statewide planning in this area makes a good deal of sense.

Our experience with the highway program should be recalled: We should recognize here, as we did with highways, the need to plan and develop airports as component and integrated parts of a national system—in this case, a national air transportation system. To do that we have to forgo the luxury of purely local—by that I mean city or county—priorities, be they priorities of financing or what-have-you. We need a broader perspective, the kind we can expect to get from the States themselves. Cities and counties, of course, can and should continue to own airports, to run them and to profit by their operation. In all probability, city and county-owned airports could profit from this amendment since States would supply additional revenue and technical assistance to them. My experience has been that jealousy and rivalry between State and county governments are more frequently found in theory than in fact. In reality, States and their counties and cities cooperate on a host of common problems and on a variety of levels; in housing, in law enforcement, in education, highway and street building, in transportation problems generally and, of course, on the new problems of pollution control. They can, I think, be expected to cooperate fully on the problems of airport planning and development.

In his individual views in the report on this bill on page 77, the distinguished Senator from Vermont (Mr. PROUTY) spoke of the need to deal with our national airport problems by enlisting Federal, State, and local cooperation. His statement, I think, underscores the need